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Abstract. In the last round of the World Cup group stage, games whose outcomes do not affect
the selection of the qualified teams are played with little enthusiasm. Furthermore, teams that have
already qualified may take into account other factors, such as the opponents it will face in the next
stage of the competition. Thus, depending on the results in the other groups and the scheduling of
the next stage, winning the game may not be in its best interest. Even more critically, there may
be situations in which a simple draw will qualify both teams for the next stage of the competition.
Any situation in which the two opposing teams do not play competitively is detrimental to the sport,
and, above all, can lead to collusion and match-fixing opportunities. We here develop a method of
evaluating competitiveness and apply it to the current format of the World Cup group stage. We
then propose changes to the current format in order to increase the stakes in the last round of games
of the group stage, making games more exciting to watch and reducing any collusion opportunities.
We appeal to the same method to evaluate the ”groups of 3” format which may be introduced in the
2026 World Cup edition, as well as a ”groups of 5” format.
Key words. tournament structure, fairness, soccer, FIFA World Cup, modeling match out-
comes, Monte Carlo simulations
AMS subject classifications. 91A99, 90B90, 65C05
1. Introduction. The soccer World Cup is a global sport event that attracts
one of the highest audiences: according to the organizing entity, FIFA, over one billion
television viewers watched the final between France and Croatia1. To further improve
the worldwide World Cup audience, FIFA is currently trying to include more countries
in the final stages of the tournament and increase the attractiveness of all of the games
played during this one-month competition.
In its current format, the World Cup consists of 32 qualified teams (via continental
qualifying tournaments) that are distributed into 8 groups of 4 teams each. In the
group stage, teams in the same group play against each other once (for a total of
6 matches per group) with the group ranking based on the current football points
system: 3 points for a win, 1 for a draw and 0 for a loss. The first two teams in each
group qualify for the knockout stage.
This schedule can lead to games being played in an unethical and unattractive way,
with a good example being the infamous match between Austria and West Germany
(Germany being at that time still divided) during the 1982 World Cup, in Gijon
(Spain). Sometimes called the “disgrace of Gijon”, the game is known in German as
the “Gijon non-aggression pact”. West Germany and Austria both played in group
2, with Algeria and Chile. To everyone’s surprise, the German Mannschaft stumbled
against Algeria, losing its first match (1-2) (the first time that a European team had
lost to an African team in a World Cup), and Austria beat Chile (1-0). In the second
round of games, West Germany beat Chile (4-1) while Algeria lost to Austria (0-2).
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At this point, Chile was already eliminated. The last two games in Group 2 were thus
decisive for Germany, Austria and Algeria. On June 24, Algeria beat Chile 3-2. From
then on, an arrangement became possible between the West Germans and Austrians.
A calculation shows that, with a simple 1-0 victory for the Mannschaft, both the
Germans and Austrians would qualify while (oddly) either a large German victory,
an Austrian victory or a draw would lead to Algeria qualifying. After 10 minutes of
the game, the Germans scored, following which both teams almost stopped for the
remaining, long, 80 minutes, under the booing of infuriated Spanish spectators. After
the scandal of Gijon (and similar games, the last two games in each group are now
played simultaneously, but this has not completely eliminated collusion opportunities.
The groups are formed using a draw procedure that changes slightly from year to
year depending on the origin of the qualified teams (FIFA tries to spread out teams
from the same continent in an even manner across all of the groups). Nevertheless,
the main structure of the draw is the following:
• Teams are divided into pots, each of which is supposed to contain teams with
similar levels of performance: the 8 best teams in pot A, the second best 8
teams in pot B, and so on. Team performance is based on a ranking that
has changed over time, and has been criticized by some football experts. The
country hosting the tournament (which qualifies automatically) is included in
pot A in order to maximize its chances of proceeding to the knockout stage
of the tournament.
• Groups are formed by picking one team from each pot such that all groups
have a ”top-level” pot-A team, a ”second-level” pot-B team, a pot-C team
and a ”weaker” pot-D team.
• Finally, the schedule of the games, i.e. the order in which the teams play
against each other is drawn randomly. As such, in some groups the last
round of games will consist of ”pot A” vs ”pot B”, and ”pot C” vs ”pot D”,
while in other groups the last matches consists of ”pot A” vs ”pot C”, and
”pot B” vs ”pot D”, or ”pot A” vs ”pot D” and ”pot B” vs ”pot C”.
We here develop a method to evaluate the competitiveness and fairness of the
last-round games, choose a model to simulate the group-stage outcomes and look for
the optimal setting that maximizes our competitiveness metric. We also apply this
method to real World-Cup data (starting from the 1998 competition, in which the
new format was adopted) and conclude that games were sub-optimally scheduled. We
find out that the points-attribution scheme does not affect the quality of games in
that a victory produces more points than a draw, which produces more points than a
loss. However, the order in which games are played, and specifically the schedule for
the last round of games, is critical and can substantially improve the competitiveness
of the last round if well-designed.
Many models have been developed to predict or simulate the outcome of football
games. For example, Lee [1] and Dyte and Clarke [2] treat the goals scored by each
team as conditionally-independent Poisson variables whose parameters depend on
team attributes and the match venue. Maher [3] found that introducing a correlation
between the number of goals scored via a bivariate Poisson distribution improved
predictive power in data from the English League. Reep, Pollard and Benjamin
[4] construct a model based on the negative binomial distribution, while Karlis and
Ntzoufras [5] use Skellam’s distribution to model the difference in the number of
goals (the margin of victory). In a following article, the latter develop a robust fitting
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method to account for abnormal large scores [6]. Most of this previous work has looked
at national championships, but only few have considered the FIFA World Cup. The
1998 World Cup is covered in [2]. Suzuki et al. [7] use a Bayesian approach to predict
the result of the 2006 World Cup, while Groll et al. [8] apply their model to the
2014 World Cup. Among the articles looking at international competitions, the focus
has been on the predictive power of the model, rather considerations of fairness and
competitiveness. An exception is the new penalty shoot-out approach proposed by
Brams and Ismail [10], which improves fairness at the knock-out stage of the World
Cup. The aim of the current article is to propose a method to assess and improve the
competitiveness and fairness of games in the group stage of the competition.
We first benchmark and calibrate the different models, based on the results in
previous World Cups and team rankings. We next develop a classification method
that allows us to quantify the attractiveness of the last round of games. Based on
the chosen model and our original method, we then use Monte Carlo simulations to
determine the key factors that affect the quality of the last round of games in the
current World Cup format. We also use our metric to assess the quality of games in
previous World Cups (with 8 groups of 4 teams) and propose a remedy to improve
the competitiveness of the last round of the group stage. The last section applies our
method to the new enlarged version of the World Cup. We here propose two options:
16 groups of 3 teams or 8 groups of 5 teams.
2. Group-stage model. We here benchmark the different models that will be
used to simulate the game outcomes. For the sake of simplicity, a team’s strength
is completely described by one single variable. Instead of using FIFA rankings, we
choose the ELO index as a proxy for team performances2. The advantage of this
index is that it is more transparent and is a more accurate reflection of a team’s real
level than the FIFA ranking [9]. The calculation method has not changed over time,
and it is thus better-suited for analyses over long time periods (we will here cover all
the World Cups starting from that in 1998). Nevertheless, the ELO and FIFA point
systems produce very similar country rankings.
Each team has an ELO index of the form [a, b], with a and b positive real numbers.
The higher the ELO index, the better the team’s performance. As in the official draw
procedure, we form groups of four teams with different ELO indices as follows: team
A’s ELO is uniformly drawn from the interval [b− b−a4 , b], team B from [b− b−a2 , b− b−a4 ],
team C from [a+ (b−a)4 , b− b−a2 ] and team D from [a, a+ b−a4 ]. The bounds a and b
are parameters in our model and will be calibrated in the next section. Intuitively,
the greater the b − a gap, the larger the performance gap between teams within the
group. Based on the ELO indices of the teams in the group, we simulate the outcomes
of their matches.
2.1. Simulating match outcomes. As we only consider a team’s ELO index,
we analyze the following relatively simple parametric models:
1. Simple Poisson model: Each time a team has the ball it can attack and
score a goal. With n attack opportunities and a probability p of scoring per
attack, the number of goals scored follows a binomial distribution B(n, p).
On average, λ = np goals will be scored by the team per game. The binomial
distribution limits the number of goals scored per game to the total amount
2All historical and current ELO ratings, as well as the details on how they are calculated, can
be found at https://www.eloratings.net
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of attacks n. If instead of considering discrete attacks, we look at ball pos-
session and introduce the probability of scoring per unit of ball possession,
λ, the number of goals scored is distributed Poisson with parameter λ. This
distribution is the limit case of the binomial distribution as n → ∞ (every
ball possession signifies an attack) and p = λn → 0 (the strict probability
becomes a probability density of scoring per unit of time possession). The
probability that team i score k goals against team j is:
P (goals = k) =
λk · e−λ
k!
(2.1)
where λ is
λ = α · ei
ei + ej
(2.2)
Here ei is the ELO index of team i, ej the ELO index of its opponent j, and
α a parameter of the model to be calibrated. The stronger the scoring team
(the higher is ei) and the weaker its opponent (the lower is ej), the easier it
will be for team i to score goals. The parameter α reflects how prolific games
are in terms of goals scored (a higher α produces games with higher scores).
Consequently, the result (ki, kj) of a game between team i with ELO index
ei and team j with ELO index ej is distributed:
(ki, kj) ∼ (X,Y )(2.3)
where X and Y are independent, and X ∼ P(α · eiei+ej ) and Y ∼ P(α ·
ej
ei+ej
).
2. Bivariate Poisson model: The bivariate Poisson model is very similar to
that above. The only difference is that it accounts for correlations between
the number of goals scored by the two teams. The underlying idea here is
that if one team scores, the other will attempt to equalize and put more effort
into scoring. This leads to open games with a greater number of goals on both
sides. On the contrary, if neither team scores the game will remain “closed”
with few goals. The final score of the game (ki, kj) is:
ki = X + Z kj = Y + Z(2.4)
where X, Y and Z are independent, and X ∼ P(α · eiei+ej ), Y ∼ P(α ·
ej
ei+ej
),
Z ∼ P(β). The correlation between ki and kj comes from the term Z, and the
greater is β the higher this correlation. This model has one more parameter
than that above (namely β).
3. Negative binomial model: In this model, when one team scores a goal,
it becomes more motivated and has a greater probability of scoring a second
goal. The scoring model starts as a Poisson distribution, and each time a goal
is scored the probability of scoring the next goal rises by a given constant.
The probability distribution of goals can be calculated and has a so-called
negative binomial distribution. The probability that team i score ki goals
against team j is:
P (ki) =
(
ki + r − 1
ki
)
· (1− α · ei
ei + ej
)r · (α · ei
ei + ej
)ki(2.5)
where r ∈ N and α > 0 are two parameters to be calibrated.
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Model Simple Poisson Bivariate Poisson Negative Binomial
Optimal parameter values
gap 3.7581 3.7582 3.4997
α 2.5156 2.5156 0.1747
β - 2.7518 · 10−10 -
r - - 13
Number of parameters 2 3 3
Log-Likelihood -535.6698 -535.6698 -534.4337
AIC 1075.3 1077.3 1074.9∗
BIC 1081.9∗ 1087.1 1084.6
Table 1: Estimation results with different models for the prediction of game scores
2.2. Rescaling the ELO distribution. The ELO indices3 usually fluctuate
between 1500 and 2200 for the teams that qualify for the World Cup. As such, eiei+ej
varies between 15001500+2200 = 0.4054 and
2200
1500+2200 = 0.5946. Consequently the “raw”
ELO indices will barely affect the number of goals scored by teams. We amplify the
performance difference between teams via a linear transformation of the original ELO
indices:
e′i = 1 + e
gap · ei −minj(ej)
maxj(ej)−minj(ej)(2.6)
After this transformation, the weakest team will have an index of 1 and the strongest
an index of 1 + egap, where gap is a parameter to be calibrated. The higher is gap,
the larger the performance gap between teams and the greater the impact of the ELO
indices on a game’s outcome.
2.3. Model selection and calibration. We now carry out maximum-likelihood
estimation of the three models presented above, in order to decide which will be used
to carry out our group simulations. The data used for these models is the results
of the first two rounds of the World Cup group stage from 1998 up to 2018. This
covers 192 games: the last round of games is not included as factors other than team
performance may play a role here (teams may prefer to lose or draw in the last game,
and finish second in the group in order to have easier knock-out games). Table 1
shows the results from this maximum-likelihood estimation.
First, since the optimal value of β is 2.7518 · 10−10, we conclude that the intro-
duction of a correlation term between the goals does not improve the accuracy of the
simple Poisson model (there is no change in the log-likelihood between the simple and
the bivariate Poisson models either). According to the AIC and BIC criteria, which
penalize the last two models as compared to the simple Poisson model, we decide
to adopt the latter for our simulation procedure. This has the advantage of being
simple to implement, tractable and having very similar performance to the Negative-
Binomial distribution. In our data, the bivariate Poisson distribution performs no
better than the univariate distribution.
Figure (1) shows the likelihood in the simple Poisson and Negative-Binomial dis-
tributions as a function of the model parameters (r = 13 for the Negative-Binomial
3All of which, historical and current, are online at https://www.eloratings.net
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(a) Poisson distribution (b) Negative-Binomial distribution
Fig. 1: The Log-likelihood of different models as a function of their parameters
model). We can clearly see that the optimal value of gap is strictly positive, so that
the ELO indices do have predictive power for game outcomes.
2.4. Additional performance checks for the Poisson model. We now com-
pare a number of statistics from our chosen Poisson model to those in our sample data
at three different levels of aggregation:
• Detailed level: Each result is considered as a separate event. As our data
set is composed of 192 games, we use the Poisson model to carry out 15000
simulations of each of the 192 games. We then count the number of occur-
rences of each event in each simulation run, and average the results over the
15000 simulations and calculate the standard deviations for each event. The
results appear in Table 3, to be compared to the actual outcomes in Table
2. The games in which at least one team scores more than four goals are
rare, and do not appear in the tables. The Poisson model provides a good
approximation to the actual data.
• Compact level: Here an event is characterized by the difference in the
scores, so that games finishing 3-1 or 4-2 would be similarly categorized as
”2-goal differences” events. Figure 2 shows the results of our simulations (in
red), compared to the actual data (in blue). As above, the Poisson model
performs well in reproducing the actual scores.
• Draw frequency: This is extreme case where we group all non-zero goal
difference outcomes into a single event, with draws being the complement (a
goal difference of zero). This allows us to see if the ratio of draws to to-
tal number of games in our model matches the sample data. The frequency
of draws in the Poisson model is 0.2133 with a standard deviation of 0.0297,
while the sample frequency is = 0.2552. As the data only includes 192 games,
we cannot say whether the fit could be improved (by reducing the a param-
eter, for example) or if our data is not truly representative of the underlying
generating process.
Overall, the previous results suggest that the Poisson model fits the score-generating
process well.
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Table 2: Number of goal outcomes in our World Cup data sample of 192 games.
Final score 0 1 2 3 4
0 14 44 22 11 8
1 23 29 13 1
2 11 3 2
3 1 0
4 0
Table 3: Average number of occurrences of scores ± standard deviation based on
15000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Final score 0 1 2 3 4
0 15.5± 3.8 39± 5.6 30.6± 5.1 17.9± 4.0 8.5± 2.9
1 18.4± 4.1 23.2± 4.5 11.4± 3.2 4.7± 2.1
2 6.0± 2.4 5.0± 2.2 1.8± 1.3
3 0.91± 0.95 0.59± 0.77
4 0.08± 0.3
Fig. 2: Score difference: Poisson model vs. actual data
3. The group-stage classification method. We now assess the attractiveness
of the group format using the previous model to simulate all the rounds of games in
a group, except for the last. For example, when considering the current format of the
World Cup with groups of four countries, we simulate the first two rounds of games
(for a total of four games). Then, given the points system, we calculate the ranking in
the group. It is worth noting that the group ranking is based only on points, and does
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not include other criteria such as the number of goals scored, goal difference etc. We
consequently cannot distinguish between two teams with the same number of points.
During the last round of games, the qualification of team i will likely not only
depend on the outcome of its own game against team j but also on that in the other
game, between teams k and l. As the last-round games are played simultaneously,
we assume that team i does not know the outcome of the other game when playing
against j: all three scenarios are possible (k beats l, l beats k and k draws with l).
For each outcome of the i vs j game, we check under which scenarios team i qualifies
for the next phase (i.e. ends up in the top two group teams). In the case that the
team ends up second position with the same number of points as the other teams,
we count the number of teams in the second position. Occupying the second position
alone (and so qualifying) is better than sharing the second position with other teams
(other criteria that are not included in our model are then used to rank the teams,
and lead to team i not progressing). Team i will choose the lowest-effort outcome
that maximizes the chances of qualification: a win (winning is better than drawing in
at least one scenario), a draw (winning=drawing in all scenarios is and better than
losing in at least one scenario) or indifference (win=drawing=losing in all scenarios).
Note that the last situation refers to the case where team i is already qualified or
cannot qualify regardless the result of game k vs. l.
For example, suppose that any scenario other than k beating l automatically
qualifies i. If team k wins, a draw between i and j will qualify i, while a loss for i
will not lead to qualification (if i wins, it will obviously progress as wins gains more
points than draws). In this case, team i will play for a draw. Even though the team
may qualify if it loses against j, a draw will increase its chances of qualification (all
scenarios are possible, including a victory for k). A victory will also qualify i, although
it does not improve the probability of qualification as compared to a draw. If, in a
given scenario, a draw leads to a shared second place while a win leads to a ”clean”
second place, or even first place, then team i will play to win.
Note that, in our model, we do not distinguish between first and second place in
the group, in the sense that teams only care about qualification to the next round.
In the actual World Cup, teams do not always want to finish first in their groups.
There have been many occasions where teams seem to have intentionally lost in order
to finish second in their group and play against weaker opponents in the knock-out
stage. This may well have occurred in the 2018 World Cup in the group with England
and Belgium, in which the winner faced more-difficult opponents (Brazil and France)
in the knock-out stage.
After having determined what team i would prefer, we carry out an analogous
analysis for its opponent j, yielding the following classification for the game i vs j:
• Stake-less games: At least one of the teams is indifferent between winning,
drawing or losing. In these games, the indifferent team has, in general, noth-
ing to gain and may field second-team players. This is unfair for the other
teams, k and l, as they played against a stronger opponent i in the previous
rounds. In addition, teams that are already qualified may take into account
other factors such as the opponents it will face in the next stage of the com-
petition. Thus, depending on the results in other groups and the scheduling
of the next stage, winning the game may not be in its best interest. These
games are not competitive and therefore should be avoided.
• Collusive games: Both teams here are looking to draw, as this will put
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both teams in the best possible situation. These games should be avoided.
• Competitive games: Neither team is indifferent here, and at least one
hopes to win. As one team wants to win and the other, at least, hopes to
draw, their aims are incompatible: if one team reaches its objective the other
will not. The two teams will thus give their maximum in this competitive
game. Our aim here is to ensure that this type of game occurs as often as
possible.
4. Assessing the current World Cup format. We use the above to assess the
last round of the current World Cup format, with groups of four teams of which the
top two qualify for the next round. We test both different point-attribution systems
as well as changes to the scheduling of the last round of games:
• Setting 1: pot A vs. pot D and pot B vs. pot C
• Setting 2: pot A vs. pot C and pot B vs. pot D
• Setting 3: pot A vs. pot B and pot C vs. pot D
We carry out 15000 simulations for each setting and point-attribution system:
the results appear in Table 4. Our conclusions are as follows:
• The points system has no impact on the quality of games (systems with 4-
points for a win produce no visible changes in the results);
• Collusive games are relatively rare, but stake-less games are not; and
• The setting has a considerable impact on the quality of games, with setting
1 being the best and setting 3 the worst.
The last of the above results is intuitive: in setting 3, A and B have already played
against the weakest teams in the previous rounds. Before the the last game, they are
likely to a good number of points, while teams C and D have few or no points. The
last round matches the best two teams (who are already or almost qualified) against
the weakest two teams (who are already or almost eliminated): the outcome of both
games has very little impact on the final group ranking.
We use our real data set to assess the impact of the last round of games as a
function of their setting. The new format has applied to six World Cups with 8
groups each. The game schedule is drawn randomly, so that each setting is equally
likely. Table 5 shows the frequency of each setting in the previous World Cups. We
use our method to calculate the frequencies of each game type as a function of the
setting. Table 6 shows the results: setting 3 produces the least0-exciting last round
of games, in line with our predictions. Nevertheless, the sample size is only small to
check whether the sample estimates fit our model predictions.
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Fig. 3: The cumulative frequencies in Monte Carlo simulations for a win giving 3
points and a draw 1 point (setting 1).
Setting type : 1 2 3 1 2 3
Points for : Win = 2 Win = 3
Draw = 1
63.05% 59.50% 42.95% 63.14% 59.49% 42.69%
1.02% 1.15% 1.68% 0.94% 1.32% 1.76%
35.93% 39.35% 55.37% 35.92% 39.19% 55.55%
Draw = 2
- - - 63.13% 59.76% 43.54%
- - - 0.88% 1.30% 1.60%
- - - 35.99% 38.94% 54.87%
Table 4: Results of the Monte Carlo simulations with 15000 iterations per run (com-
petitive, collusive and stakeless games).
Setting 1 2 3
Occurrences 15 19 14
Frequencies 31.25% 39.58% 29.17%
Table 5: Number of occurrences and frequencies of the different group settings in our
sample data.
Type of game Competitive Stake-less Collusion opportunity
Setting 1 50% 50% 0%
Setting 2 57.89% 36.84% 5.26%
Setting 3 32.14% 67.86% 0%
Table 6: Frequencies of types of games as a function of the group setting.
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5. The 2026 World Cup. In 2026, FIFA plans to have 48 qualified teams,
distributed into 16 groups of 3 teams. The first two teams in each group (2/3 of teams)
then qualify to the knockout stage. The transition from 1/2 to 2/3 teams qualifying
has already been tested in the second biggest soccer competition: the UEFA Euro.
Between 1996 and 2012, the proportion of teams qualifying for the knockout stage
was 1/2 in a 16-team tournament (4 groups of 4 teams), growing to 2/3 for the 2016
UEFA Euro (24 teams divided into 6 groups of 4). As a result, the number of goals
scored fell (from an average of over 2.5 goals per match in the group phases between
1996 and 2012 to a figure of 1.92 goals per match during the 2016 group phase),
with the games becoming unattractive. This natural experiment then suggests that
tournaments with a high proportion of teams qualifying lead to less attractive games.
As such, alternative propositions have been made for the enlargement of the number
of qualified teams for the next FIFA World Cups: for instance a 40-team tournament
(8 groups of 5 teams) in which only 2 teams per group (2/5) qualify for the knockout
stage. In addition, the group-match schedule (the order in which the teams play
against each other) appears to have a considerable impact on the quality of the games
in this phase, and in particular during the last round of games.
In this last section, taking into consideration FIFA’s intention to increase the
number of teams participating, we evaluate two potential new World-Cup formats.
5.1. First option: 48 groups of 3. Some FIFA officials are currently proposing
a “48-team, groups of 3” format, in which the best two teams in each group qualify
for the next knock-out stage. As the groups contain an odd number of teams, one
team per group will not play in the last round of games. There are therefore only
three possibilities in the last round:
• Setting 1: The weakest team is the passive team in the last round
• Setting 2: The middle team is the passive team in the last round
• Setting 3: The strongest team is the passive team in the last round
We carry out 15000 Monte-Carlo simulations to assess the quality of the last
round: the results appear in Table 7. We have also checked that the number of points
attributed for wins and draws do not affect the results and that ”collusive” games, as
defined previously, cannot occur here.
The conclusion is clear: it is key that the passive team in the last round be
the strong team. In our model, when the strongest team plays the first two rounds
of games, there is a 92% chance of a last game in which both teams will give their
best. The only two situations in which the last game is stakeless or even conducive
to unfair behavior are as follows:
• 2 losses for the passive team: Both of the other teams have already quali-
fied, and the last game is completely stakeless. In some particular situations,
depending on the results in other groups and the playoff schedule, some qual-
ified teams may want to lose in order to finish second in the group and thus
meet a less-strong team in the next round. This leads to uninteresting games
that should be avoided.
• 1 loss, 1 draw for the passive team: Of the two other teams, one has
already qualified and the other only needs a draw to do so. The latter will
face a team that has already qualified and may end up with a much-easier
game than that which the passive team had against the already qualified
team (which had not yet qualified at that time). This is detrimental to
the fairness of the game. In our model, this type of game is qualified as
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Table 7: Results of the Monte Carlo simulations with 15000 iterations.
Setting type 1 2 3
Interesting games 23.10% 79.12% 92.23%
Stakeless games 76.90% 20.88% 7.77%
Collusion games 0% 0% 0%
“stakeless” as one team is indifferent while the other is aiming for at least a
draw. Nevertheless, a “stakeless” game in this World Cup format can produce
much more unfair behavior as the passive team no longer has any impact on
the group’s outcome. In the 4-team per group format, there is “pressure”
from the unknown result in the other last-round game (which is played at the
same time). This no longer applies in the 3-team per group format.
When the strongest team plays the first two rounds, it is unlikely that they will be
in such situations. However, when the weakest team plays the first two games, these
outcomes become more probable (they actually happen 77% of the time!). In case
this World Cup format would be carried forward. In order to preserve the
fairness and beauty of the game, FIFA should drop its group randomization
draw and implement a predefined schedule in which the pot A team will
be the passive team in the last round.
5.2. Second alternative: 8 groups of 5. A second alternative is be to consider
a World Cup with 40 teams divided into 8 groups of 5 teams. The first two teams in
each group qualify for the knock-out stage. In this new format, each team will have to
play one more game in the group stage, and the last round of games will also include
a “passive” team due to the odd number of teams per group. This passive team will
have played all its games previously and will have to watch the other four teams play
during the last round.
As in the previous cases, we carry out a Monte Carlo simulation to determine
which combination of games should be played in the last round. The results appear
in Table 8, where the attribute “game quality” is that defined previously, “passive
team” is the team that has already played four games and “setting” corresponds to
the matching combination of the four teams left. The results are quite intuitive:
• Setting 3 produces far worse results than settings 1 and 2. This is the one in
which the strongest teams left play against each other, and the weakest two
play each other.
• The choice of the passive team affects the quality of results via two mecha-
nisms:
1. The stronger the passive team, the more chances it has to win its games
and be qualified for the next round. There will consequently only be
one spot left for the other four teams playing in the last round. This
increases the chances of there being some teams that cannot qualify
among the four left, leading to uninteresting last-round games. Based
on this mechanism, the weaker the passive team the better the
quality of last-round games.
2. The second effect is related to the position of the four teams left relative
to the passive team. If the passive team is the weakest “pot E” (or
the strongest “pot A”), then it is likely that the four teams left had
positive (negative) results against the passive team. What matters here
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Table 8: Results of the Monte Carlo simulations with 5000 iterations.
Setting: 1 2 3
Game quality: Comp Col Stkless Comp Col Stkless Comp Col Stkless
Passive team
Pot A 48.31% 0.10% 51.59% 47.85% 0.39% 51.76% 45.49% 1.09% 53.42%
Pot B 48.61% 0.21% 51.18% 46.83% 0.81% 52.36% 43.42% 1.63% 54.95%
Pot C 49.87% 0.33% 49.80% 48.28% 0.67% 51.05% 37.70% 3.22% 59.08%
Pot D 52.33% 0.83% 46.84% 49.45% 1.31% 49.24% 41.29% 1.91% 56.80%
Pot E 63.81% 1.12% 35.07% 61.47% 1.46% 37.07% 53.05% 1.94% 45.01%
is not whether they won or lost, but that these four teams had the same
outcome against the passive team. They thus start the last-round games
with the same head start, leading to competitive last-round games. On
the contrary, if the passive team is from pot C, the teams coming from
pot A and B were likely to have won against it, while the teams from
pot D and E were likely to have lost. As such, the last round starts
with a considerable gap between the teams in terms of points, so that
some teams may be already qualified (or not be able to qualify). This
phenomenon stands out clearly in setting 3, where the pot A and B
teams have played against the weakest teams and play each other in
the last round. It is likely that they have both already qualified before
the last round, making this game stakeless. Consequently, the more
extreme is the passive team (pots A or E), the better is the
last round of games.
Based on the previous results, we conclude that setting 3 should be avoided
(setting 1 is the optimal one), while the pot-E team should be the passive team in
the last round.
6. Conclusion. This article has developed an assessment method of the com-
petitiveness and attractiveness of the last round of games in the FIFA World Cup
group stages. Using this new method, we note that the scheduling of games, in par-
ticular the choice of teams playing each other in the last round, is crucial for obtaining
exciting and fair last-round games. Furthermore, our results underline that the point-
attribution system has no impact in small groups. The optimal game schedule depends
on the format of the World Cup, but our clear recommendation is that FIFA should
drop its current schedule-randomization process in the draw for the group matches.
In the current World Cup format, we recommend that the last group games should be
pot-A teams against pot-D teams, and pot-B teams against pot-C teams. Scheduling
these games in advance has no negative impact on any aspect of the competition (lo-
gistics, fairness etc.), but increases the attractiveness and competitiveness of the last
round. In the forthcoming 48 teams in groups of 3 format, the “pot-A” team should
be the passive team in the last round.
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